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Social networking sites have become increasingly relevant in the study of 
democracy and culture in recent years. This study explores the interconnectedness 
of social networks, the imposition of state control, and management of social 
behavior by comparing various literature on the operation of repression in Thai and 
Philippine cyberspaces. It examines the overt and covert policing of daily 
interactions in digital environments and unpacks governmental technologies’ 
disciplinary mechanisms following Michel Foucault’s notion of government and 
biopolitical power. Subjugation in the context of social networks merits analysis for 
it sheds light on the practice of active and passive self-censorship—the former 
driven by the pursuit of a moral self-image and the latter by state-sponsored fear. 
In tracing various points of convergence and divergence in the practice of cyber 
control in Thailand and the Philippines, the study found newer domains of 
regulation of social behavior applicable to today’s democracies.   
Keywords: cyberspace, algorithm, policing, online repression, self-censorship 
 
INTRODUCTION 
According to Habermas (2006), political communication on the internet claims 
“unequivocal democratic merits” in the context of undermining censorship of authoritarian 
regimes (p. 423). Quite the contrary, it could be observed that in nations like Thailand and the 
Philippines, the internet has been instrumental in silencing dissent or harassing or jailing 
opposition members. While the internet has long been regarded as a facilitator of democracy 
(Benkler, 2006; Gillmor, 2004; Grossman, 1995; Rheingold, 1993/2000) and a platform for 
political discourse (Poster, 1997 in Geiger, 2009), it has also been utilized by authoritarian and 
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authoritarian-like governments as an instrument to suppress people’s freedom (Sombatpoonsiri, 
2018) and exert hegemonic control in cyberspace (Frechette, 2005; Laungaramsri, 2016; 
Schaffar, 2016; Sinpeng, 2013). The motivations and objectives of these governments may 
vary, but the exercise of hegemony and the operation of repression are relatively similar. 
Mainly, in their attempts to dictate the political discourse in “digital public spheres” (Hearn, 
2010; Macnamara, 2008; Mahlouly, 2013; Valtysson, 2012), such regimes instigate fear or 
assert a peculiar sense of morality to manage citizen behavior and police information flows.  
This study surveys the current scholarship on Thailand and the Philippines, where the 
incidence of cyber repression and manipulation has increased at an alarming rate in recent years. 
As both Thailand and the Philippines are suffering from disinformation and extreme 
polarization, these countries are interesting case studies in understanding the operation of online 
repression in democratic states in Southeast Asia. In comparing their experiences, the study 
elaborates on how various scholars identify the roles of the authorities (military junta in 
Thailand and the Rodrigo Duterte administration in the Philippines) and their supporters in the 
development of new and more efficient forms of cyber control. It discusses the activities of the 
Thai junta’s Cyber Scouts and Duterte’s keyboard army in an attempt to compare and unravel 
the systematic operation of hegemonic control in these two countries’ cyberspace. 
The study raises the following questions: How does the internet become instrumental in 
the reproduction of the state’s domination over individuals’ daily affairs? What are the tools 
and techniques that authoritarian regimes use in patrolling and controlling cyberspace? How is 
normative power exercised in cyberspace? How does cyber trolling and harassment influence 
the governance of the self and others? These questions will be answered following Michel 
Foucault’s concept of government and biopolitical power while employing a comparative 
approach to establish and analyze the essential systemic features of governmental and political 
interventions in contemporary digital spaces. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This research extends Sombatpoonsiri’s (2018) exploration, which compared the Thai 
and Philippine governments’ strategies of political repression and cyber control. Observing the 
striking similarities in the internet regime and political situation in Thailand and the Philippines, 
she explained how autocratic and illiberal regimes exploit existing social divides to consolidate 
power. She argued that the government’s instrumentalization of cyberbullying is a 
manifestation of the deeper crisis of social polarization.  Complementing her analysis on the 
correlation between the crises of polarization and governments’ mobilization of the public in 
controlling cyberspace, this study refers to Sombatpoonsiri’s described forms of political 
repression as governmental techniques that conduct people’s conduct in digital environments. 
Similarly, recognizing the vulnerability of democracy under authoritarian regimes, 
Sinpeng (2013) zeroed in on Thailand’s internet regime (p. 421) as she examined the role of 
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the internet in the entrenchment of democracy. Sinpeng questioned the internet’s democratizing 
role in the cyber era, positing that the internet serves as a tool for repression through state online 
coercion, as was the case in Thailand. Along these lines, Laungaramsri (2016) tackled 
Thailand’s “troubling” shift toward censorship, surveillance, and suppression in cyberspace. 
Drawing on Foucault’s “governmentality,” she described the normalization of surveillance in 
post-coup Thailand through the politicization, securitization, and militarization of the internet 
by the Thai junta. Meanwhile, Ramasoota (2016) touched on cyber-witch hunting in Thailand 
in the post-2014 coup as she elaborated on how cyber-witch hunters harass people with 
differing views and undermine their privacy rights. 
Despite the absence of cyber-witch hunts and anti-royalism in the Philippines, the 
promotion of fear and the exercise of hegemonic control of an authoritarian-like regime such 
as Duterte’s also threaten freedom of expression and privacy rights. Incidence of cyber trolling 
and harassment of political opposition in the Philippines has increased dramatically since 
Duterte’s assumption of the presidency. Ong and Cabañes (2018) pointed out that many 
Filipinos who expressed disgust towards Duterte were repeatedly hounded and harassed with 
the use of negative speeches, expletives, and death threats. Whereas the research of Ong and 
Cabañes explained the “moral justification in the disinformation project” (pp. 29-30, see also 
Ong & Cabañes, 2019) and impressed how cyber trolling has become a tool for cyber 
manipulation and control, most noteworthy is their effort to expose the existence of an industry 
responsible for the manipulation of algorithms of online platforms, which help the promotion 
of political propagandas in the Philippines. 
While this study often refers to the works of the previous researchers throughout its 
discussion, it simultaneously deviates by suggesting categories in which the described coercive 
activities could be plotted. By making apparent the characteristics of identified repressive 
actions, the study determines the type of technology that a state and its supporters execute to 
govern and influence groups and individuals, such as algorithmic gatekeeping, algorithmic 
policing, and cyber policing. As an art of government, these technologies are often employed 
synchronously whenever possible. 
In the next sections, the study briefly explains Foucault’s notion of biopolitical power, 
which is mobilized as a conceptual tool to analyze internet regimes and the practice of 
government in Thailand and the Philippines. This concept acts as a bridge that links 
governmentality with new technologies of policing (algorithmic gatekeeping, algorithmic and 
cyber policing). These technologies exploit the vulnerabilities of social network designs by 
manipulating the flow of information and discourse on the internet. To adequately describe 
these new technologies of government, the supposed democratizing effect of the internet is 
questioned as it explains how the “illusion” of freedom is manufactured through and within the 
internet’s internal and external logic. 
 
 
132   Policing Cyberspace 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The supposedly “mutually beneficial” arrangement between citizens and the state  
(controlling the population to foster both citizen’s life and the state’s strength) introduced the 
paradigm of biopolitical power (Foucault, 1981, pp. 248-252). The goal of biopolitical power 
is to optimize and multiply life by subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive 
regulations (Foucault, 1978, p. 137). This kind of power is exercised through constant 
supervision of its subjects (the individual). Individuals regularly police themselves and others 
by examining and controlling their and other people’s thoughts and behavior in accordance with 
what society has constructed as the norm (Bevir, 1999, p. 65). With the birth of biopolitical 
power, social norms have become a critical regulator of people’s communication and daily 
activities. Moreover, with the promise of the society to secure life and happiness, people subject 
themselves to such power. 
The society’s essence gives teeth to biopolitical power. In describing the intrinsic nature 
of the society, John Stuart Mill (1859/2003, p. 139) wrote: 
Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is 
answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, 
everyone who receives protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and 
the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound 
to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. 
The idea that one is bound to observe a certain conduct towards the rest gives the society 
the authority to conduct the conduct of an individual. Mill (1859/2003) added that society is 
granted jurisdiction over a person’s behavior, especially when it prejudicially affects other 
people’s interests (p. 139). Because of this jurisdiction, individuals are expected to discipline 
themselves and act following the norms.  
This arrangement between the individual and society would also have an impact on the 
construction of the moral self-image, since morality is understood as “the attempt to make 
oneself accountable for one’s own actions” (Dean, 1999/2010, p. 19). Self-regulation is treated 
as a moral activity, as the practice of government is presumed to know “what constitutes good, 
virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of individuals and collectives” (p. 19). That said, 
conducting other people’s conduct becomes a moral activity too. This explains why public 
opinion, which is presumed to constitute ethical principles, is used to regulate, or in some cases, 
punish individuals who, for instance, have dissenting and opposing views. 
In other words, government is the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault, 1982, pp. 220-221 
in Dean, 1999/2010, p. 17). The different meanings of conduct imply some sort of calculation 
as to how government is carried out. It also influences today’s understanding of self-control or 
self-regulation, as conduct in this framework involves conducting oneself (pp. 17-18). To 
govern is to manage human behavior via social norms, structure the field of possible action, 
and act on individuals’ capacities for action (p. 22). In this light, an actor’s (state or supporters) 
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exploitation of digital platforms’ architecture and manipulation of social media algorithms play 
a significant role in shaping human behavior and delimiting social interaction. 
Meanwhile, it is the law that gives programs and technologies its coercive power 
(Foucault, 1978/2001, p. 232). Although Foucault was originally referring to the programs in 
educational, medical, and military institutions when describing the relationship between law, 
power, program, and technologies, it can be argued that the same principles may apply in digital 
spaces. Social media users are similarly subjected to coercive measures that follow sets of 
calculated prescriptions (i.e., algorithms and software designs), arranged spaces (i.e., filters, 
sitemaps, or firewalls), and regulated behaviors (i.e., website’s privacy policies or terms of 
service that govern the use of a digital platform). Additionally, these sets of rules are stacked 
on top of laws and state policies that govern citizens. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Apart from conducting a survey of literature that reflects on the state of democracies in 
Thailand and the Philippines, the author gathered empirical evidence from various Facebook 
pages of public figures (or of those supporting and promoting public figures) such as Duterte’s 
Duterte Media, Duterte sa Pagbabago Bukas (Duterte for Tomorrow’s Change), Duterte 
Diehard Supporters (DDS),1 Duterte Phenomenon, Pinoy Monkey Pride, Thinking Pinoy, 
Mocha Uson Blog, DU30 Trending News, or pro-junta’s platforms such as The New Atlas, Alt 
Thai News Network, and New Eastern Outlook.2 As a qualitative research, the author treated 
these online groups and platforms as his field and employed purposeful sampling to provide 
“information-rich cases” (Patton, 2005, p. 2).  Immersion in these groups involved observation 
of several state supporters’ posts and activities. The author also analyzed the content and 
comment section of several YouTube videos that promoted the state’s agenda. To discover 
various pro-state channels, the author followed the recommendations on YouTube, as they often 
suggest similar contents and channels.  
 
ANALYSIS 
This section compares several scholars’ discussion on how people’s conduct is 
conducted in the Thai and Philippine cyberspaces. In navigating various works, this study 
intervenes by hinting on digital governmental techniques that are observably practiced by 
authoritarian regimes such as algorithmic gatekeeping, algorithmic policing, and cyber 
policing. To understand these technologies, it is imperative to introduce what an algorithm is 
and describe what it can do. 
Algorithms are sets of instructions designed to perform specific tasks or operations 
efficiently. Offering a more critical definition, Tufekci (2015) describes algorithms as 
“computational processes that are used to make decisions of such complexity that inputs and 
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outputs are neither transparent nor obvious to the casual human observer” (p. 206). While some 
computational processes involve simple operations such as multiplication of numbers, issues 
could be raised on other algorithms that involve “subjective decision making” wherein no single 
correct answer could be determined (pp. 206-207). In the context of digital journalism, 
algorithms affect the selecting, sorting, and ordering of news (Carlson, 2017, p. 2). It also 
prioritizes and shapes the content that becomes visible to the people.  
In environments where popularity drives the production of contents and personalization 
is valued over mass messaging (Carlson, 2017, p. 7), relevance becomes critical in determining 
algorithmic calculations. As tech giants present social networking sites as spaces that 
individuals could control through the logic of relevance, these sites give an impression to their 
users that one could curate their news feed, block contents that they deem foul or obscene, or 
follow and share stories which they consider informative or entertaining. However, it must be 
noted that what becomes relevant to the public may be influenced by what is presented or 
offered to them. Hence, when algorithmic manipulation limits content selection, what becomes 
relevant to social media users become regulated without the public’s knowledge. This lack of 
visibility of algorithmic decisions reinforces the “illusion” of freedom appropriated to and by 
the people. It is this lack of visibility of algorithms that makes social media users vulnerable to 
manipulation. The maneuvering of internet content, as well as the discourse in the said platform, 
in effect, creates an illusion of choices as choices become pre-determined by an algorithm. 
Tufekci (2015) notes that such manipulations are performed routinely in many online platforms. 
She writes, “they range from purposes as mundane as deciding the color of a button, to decisions 
as which news article is shown to the public” (p. 205). 
The regulation of digital content consumed by the public is carried out through 
algorithmic gatekeeping and algorithmic policing. Tufekci (2015) defines algorithmic 
gatekeeping as “the process by which transparent algorithmic computational-tools dynamically 
filter, highlight, suppress, or otherwise play an editorial role…in determining information flows 
through online platforms and similar media” (pp. 207-208). Algorithmic gatekeeping is 
instrumental in managing public opinion, for it helps actors control political communication 
and meaning-making processes through algorithmically driven filters. On the other hand, 
algorithmic policing is used as a formal apparatus of control (Norris, 2008), which involves big 
data surveillance tasked to predict risks and future crimes (Brayne, 2017).   
Several Facebook pages and communities contribute largely to the algorithmic 
gatekeeping and policing of the Philippine and Thai cyberspaces. Like-minded Filipino 
supporters of Duterte gather in Facebook pages of public figures (or of those supporting and 
promoting public figures) such as Duterte’s Duterte Media, Duterte sa Pagbabago Bukas 
(Duterte for Tomorrow’s Change), Duterte Diehard Supporters, Pinoy Monkey Pride, Thinking 
Pinoy and DU30 Trending News,—together they disseminate content that supports Duterte’s 
policy decisions and actions. Similarly, the case in Thailand is where the right-wing and anti-
liberal online media such as T-News, Chaophraya News, Deep News, The New Atlas, Alt Thai 
News Network and New Eastern Outlook align their content and activities with those of the 
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cyber scouts, Garbage Collector Organization (GCO), and the military junta (Sombatpoonsiri, 
2018, p. 4). Following the logic of social media algorithms, the government, social media 
influencers, and supporters’ (Duterte’s DDS in the Philippines and the pro-junta online media 
in Thailand) combined effort would have, in theory, an impact on their countries’ information 
flows. The sheer volume and frequency of the production and proliferation of pro-Duterte and 
pro-junta contents would have influenced the computational processes of these sites and created 
a sense of relevance in various social media’s programming language. Facebook’s banning of 
fake accounts linked to pro-state groups and the military in 2019 (Thailand) and 2020 
(Philippines) provides clues on the potential influence of algorithmic gatekeeping and policing 
on people’s activities and behavior in digital platforms. 
Social politics curation or the practice of curating news and political content on social 
networking sites (Thorson, 2014, p. 207) has become instrumental in exercising algorithmic 
manipulation in the Philippines. A number of celebrities and bloggers like Mocha Uson (a 
former singer-dancer and a current appointive public official), RJ Nieto (the author of the pro-
Duterte Facebook page Thinking Pinoy), Mark Lopez (a pro-Duterte blogger), and many others 
who have large followings have taken the lead in curating news in the Philippines. Reports 
show (see VERA Files Year-ender Report 2017) that their active sharing and distribution of 
content that support and venerate Duterte have sustained the generation of likes for such posts. 
Duterte’s keyboard army and supporters backed these social media influencers. Believing that 
Duterte is the “leader that Filipinos need” (Maboloc, 2018, p. 93), they “willingly” participate 
in spreading pro-Duterte content on the internet, regardless of the content’s credibility.3 Further, 
Duterte’s cyber troops have been relentless in attacking his critics, particularly those who 
oppose the government’s war on drugs, which has claimed thousands of lives through 
extrajudicial killings (Sombatpoonsiri, 2018, p. 3). 
Although most celebrities, bloggers, or other fervent supporters of the Duterte 
administration claim that they act on their own accord, Ong and Cabañes (2018) expose the 
existence of an institutionalized network of disinformation that guides them by explaining how 
politicians utilized this network to influence digital platforms’ algorithms. They also report that 
in its operation, “high-level strategists operators pass on the 24/7 running of these accounts 
(Facebook fake accounts) to lower-level account operators” (Ong & Cabañes, 2018, p. 50). 
Multiple fake social media accounts are used in their operation to amplify their propaganda and 
ensure a “high degree of algorithmic visibility, as they can maintain intense interactivity and 
engagement with their followers and supporters” (pp. 37, 50). These accounts often manifest 
“inauthentic behavior,” defined by Facebook as the use of deceptive behaviors to conceal an 
organization’s identity, making the organization and its campaign seem “more popular or 
trustworthy” than it actually is (Gleicher, 2019). 
As propaganda becomes highly visible in digital platforms, the more it can “hook” or 
“capture” users. This is possible through political actors’ constant production of propagandistic 
materials and social media’s internal computational processes that help users further immerse 
in materials and contents related to what they click on their feed. Since algorithms assume its 
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users’ choices and behavior, users who interact with a particular content may end up seeing 
more of that material. Once users become “captives” of both the platform and certain content, 
it is highly likely that the social networking site, guided by its algorithm, would direct them to 
other videos and threads with similar content. For instance, if a YouTube user who has just 
started following a propaganda lets YouTube’s autoplay function work, the platform will decide 
to immerse that user in more videos that it deems relevant. YouTube also has a mechanism that 
remembers watched videos. Suggestions and updates based on viewing history welcome a user 
when they reopen the platform. This design makes it convenient for pro-Duterte vloggers to 
promote pro-Duterte content as the platform helps them reach out to and update their audience. 
YouTube’s relevance, ranking, and search algorithms can also induce the repetition of key 
propaganda messages. This repetition helps propaganda become the “truth” to propaganda 
believers, and this “truth” is instrumental in influencing how they pass judgment on others. 
While this study highlights certain actors’ manipulation of algorithms to affect people’s 
moral compass, attention must be given to media content production, especially since media 
content also drives faithful readership or viewership. Several audio-visual materials from Pro-
Duterte bloggers use the vernacular of the “people” (by “people” the study pertains to the 
supporters of Duterte). Their tone is often conversational, and their choices of words appeal to 
the ordinary Filipino, as they employ common street language and even profanity on some 
occasions (see the regular posts of Mr. Riyoh, Banat By, Mark Lopez, etc.). They also sound 
as if they represent the Filipino people, providing their people with a voice that has long been 
silenced or neglected by technocrats or reformists. Their videos follow Duterte’s “anti-
establishment strategy” (Maboloc, 2019, p. 170) and follow an “us-versus-them” narrative, a 
characteristic familiar to populist rhetorical styles. These political communication techniques 
make some of their followers assert that their likes should reclaim “power” from the educated 
and landed elite. More importantly, the repetition and multiplication of such political content 
aid in transforming propaganda into a “basic grammar” (Vatsov, 2018, p. 77) that frames state 
supporters’ articulation of moral intuitions. 
Another form of policing that has gained popularity in contemporary authoritarian 
regimes is what several scholars refer to as cyber policing (Ramasoota, 2016; Sinpeng, 2013; 
Sombatpoonsiri, 2018). What distinguishes cyber policing from algorithmic policing is its 
overtness—while the latter operates outside the conscious, that is, often stealthy and invisible 
(Tufekci, 2015, pp. 208-209), the former allows itself to be known to instigate fear. Cyber 
policing also involves the policing of information flows by controlling citizens’ behavior 
(Sinpeng, 2013, p. 423). This mode of policing is often supported and normalized by the state 
through legislation or state policies. In other contexts, the head of state’s public statements 
could also promote the normalization of cyber policing, for, in such places, people may regard 
every word uttered by the head of state as the policy of the state. As such, cyber policing may 
enforce self-censorship. The promotion of self-censorship in cyberspace is further discussed in 
the subsequent paragraphs. 
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Thailand’s Cyber Scout Program and cyber-witch hunting are examples of what the 
study pertains to as cyber policing. According to Laungaramsri (2016), the initiation of the 
Cyber Scout Program and cyber-witch hunt and the junta’s employment of deceptive tactics 
curtails freedom of expression in Thailand (pp. 195-204). Observing the practice of cyber 
policing in Thailand, the Computer Crime Act (CCA) in 2007 and Article 112 or the lèse-
majesté act of the Thai Penal Code provide guidelines (or “programs”) that inform individual 
behavior. Apart from acting as “grids for the perception and evaluation of things” (Foucault, 
1978/2001, p. 232), they also create a blueprint that dictates how society should regulate its 
people in Thai cyberspace. Briefly, the CCA of 2007 legalizes the blocking of internet content 
by the government, and it makes internet content providers liable for any direct or indirect 
violations (Ramasoota, 2011 in Sinpeng, 2013, p. 428). It also legalizes the infringement of 
people’s right to privacy, as the law permits the exposure of the identities of internet users 
without the users’ consent (p. 428). Sinpeng notes that this law does not provide clarity as to 
what exactly it specifies as a crime and any actions committed online, which the government 
deems as a threat to national security could be legally charged (pp. 428-429). Article 112 or the 
lèse-majesté act, on the other hand, prohibits defamation, insults or threats to the King, the 
Queen, the Heir-apparent, or the Regent. Violators of Article 112 could face three to fifteen 
years of imprisonment for each count of offense (Ramasoota, 2016, p. 271). Needless to say, 
these laws serve as regulatory mechanisms in directing people’s offline and online activities 
and behavior. These laws empower the Cyber Scouts, and they also serve as the driving force 
behind several cases of cyber-witch hunting in Thailand. 
The Cyber Scout Program is a project initiative of the royalist-conservative government 
of Abhisit Vajjajiva that professionalized online royalist vigilante groups in Thailand (Schaffar, 
2016, p. 224). It established the organization called the Cyber Scout Thailand, which was set 
up to “create ethical and moral online conduct and ensure the creative and appropriate use of 
information, communication and technology” (cyberscout.in.th). The members of this program, 
called Cyber Scouts, are given instructions on the historical significance of the monarchy, as 
well as the cyber laws and ethics, and are provided with technical training (Schaffar, 2016, p. 
224; Sinpeng, 2013, p. 432). They work undercover to befriend suspects on Facebook, start 
conversations about sensitive issues, patrol cyberspace, and report violators of the lèse-majesté 
to the authorities (Schaffar, 2016). 
It is important to note that while Thailand’s Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technology (MICT) supports these Cyber Scouts, the members participate 
voluntarily (Ramasoota, 2016, pp. 273-274). Volunteerism, in this context, appeals to people’s 
sense of morality. Activities such as identifying and locating violators of the CCA of 2007 and 
Article 112 are perceived as altruistic, as they are deemed to contribute to the reduction of 
nonconformity and social tensions. Moreover, these volunteers work in incognito mode 
(invisible to others). Since anyone, such as friends or colleagues, can be a Cyber Scout, it 
encourages people to be careful with whatever they do or post online. Hence, apart from the 
laws’ vagueness regarding what the state deems punishable, knowledge about Cyber Scout’s 
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existence potentially creates a cloud of fear. In such a context, fear becomes a fundamental tool 
in governing the self and others. 
Another Thai organization that monitored people’s behavior on the internet for the 
purpose of protecting the monarchy is the self-proclaimed ultra-royalist Garbage Collector 
Organization (GCO). Founded by Major General Rienthong Nanna, a retired medical doctor 
and a director of Mongkotwattana Hospital, the GCO derived its name from the idea that people 
expressing contrary views are trash (Stapleton, 2015 in Ramasoota, 2016, p. 276). Schaffar 
(2016) states it is an organization of ordinary people from the streets who participate in cyber-
witch hunting, or the reproaching and public lynching of “social rebels or those expressing non-
conforming views online” through the circulation of the nonconformists’ “unorthodox 
attitudes” to the “conforming community” on the internet (Ramasoota, 2016, p. 269). Their 
activities included the public humiliation and pacification of the supporters and business 
partners of the exiled Prime Minister Thaksin whom the people refer to as the Red Shirts 
(Schaffar, 2016). They also collectively campaigned to expose violations of lèse-majesté. The 
GCO’s cyber-witch hunt activities were considered more threatening since they involved 
privacy rights violations and offline mobbing. 
Cyber-witch hunt undermines Thai citizens’ privacy rights through doxxing, defined as 
the hacker’s habit of collecting personal and private information to be released publicly against 
a person’s wishes (Ramasoota, 2016, p. 273). GCO’s activities often involved doxxing. A well-
documented example of such is the case of a Red Shirt activist, Tananun Buranasiri. The GCO 
disclosed Tananun Buranasiri and her family’s personal information to the public after she 
posted comments that are perceived as violating Article 112. The disclosed information 
included the location of her workplace, and when the mob started appearing in front of her 
workplace, her employer decided to fire her. The misfortune of Tananun Buranasiri did not end 
with the termination of her employment as the GCO unrelentingly harassed her online by 
“insulting her and exchanging fantasies about how to ‘get rid’ of her” (Schaffar, 2016, p. 216). 
Other pro-monarchy political groups such as the Seri Thai Movement, Thai Netizen 
Network, and the People’s Alliance for Democracy movement encourage their members to 
participate in the policing of the Thai cyberspace by reporting online violators of lèse-majesté 
to MICT. In 2012 the Thai Free News reported that the People’s Alliance for Democracy 
movement alone was responsible for “filing 16 complaints accusing individuals, including 
some high-profile journalists, of committing computer crimes” (Sinpeng, 2013, p. 432). 
In the Philippines, it is in the network disinformation described by Ong and Cabañes 
that cyberbullying and trolling, which are more subtle forms of cyber policing (compared to 
Thailand), are exercised. It is, in a sense, the modern form of Foucault’s “government of men 
by men.” Cyber trolling police people in several ways. For instance, Filipinos who express 
opposing views in public Facebook pages are repeatedly hounded and harassed by Duterte’s 
keyboard army not only through negative speech or expletives but also death threats (Ong & 
Cabañes, 2018, p. 13). Amplification of pro-Duterte messages by both Duterte supporters and 
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troll accounts also creates a sense of “public consensus” in threads that touch upon controversial 
political issues. It is also a common practice to attack “nonconformists” by appealing to 
people’s morality and “patriotism;” Pro-Duterte accounts, for example, accuse Duterte’s critics 
as evil, self-centered, elitist, anti-Filipino, or anti-progress. There are also instances when they 
would just repeatedly dismiss dissent as “stupid,” “ignorant,” or “misinformed.” 
The way the keyboard army attacks and silences Duterte’s critics are easily comparable 
with how Thailand’s GCO conducts cyber-mobbing. Both groups are notorious for their usage 
of indecent language and offensive speech. Stemming their strength from the grassroots, they 
fearlessly harass non-conforming people all in the name of defending their respective 
champions. The activities of these cyber trolls promote self-regulation among social media 
users, especially to those who wish to spare themselves the trouble of engaging or being 
harassed by the Duterte or Thai junta supporters. This form of cyber policing could enforce 
self-censorship as it encourages individuals to discipline and control their thoughts and actions 
to avoid state punishment or societal judgment. 
There are, however, fundamental differences between the two. Since the type of 
authoritarianism in Thailand and the Philippines varies, the type of supporters and the policing 
activities will also vary. Arguably, Duterte enjoys a rather stable popular support while the Thai 
regime relies heavily on many autocratic techniques to remain in power. As a result, Duterte’s 
keyboard army shows no interest in cracking down or spying on their targets, unlike the Thai 
cyber scouts or GCO. Keyboard armies focus their energy on silencing political enemies and 
spreading disinformation to gain greater support and attract more followers. Meanwhile, 
Thailand’s GCO has been known for infiltrating anti-monarchy pages to search and destroy 
anti-monarchists. They pretend to insult the monarchy to provoke similar action (Ramasoota, 
2016, p. 279) and ultimately identify those who violate the lèse-majesté. In Foucauldian terms, 
these fundamental differences manifest the specific regularities, logic, strategy, and reason for 
distinct regimes of practices.  
As exhibited by the practices of online policing in Thailand and the Philippines, the 
seemingly overwhelming presence of cyber scouts and trolls and their constant harassment of 
the “enemies” of the state contribute to the normalization and legitimization of repression in 
cyberspace. In the case of Thailand, its transitioning back to democracy paved the way for the 
reinforcement of increased censorship and control over the internet through legislation and 
cyber policing. The government’s imposition of harsh penalties for violating internet-related 
laws and their supporters’ active collaboration in identifying and harassing nonconformist 
citizens has resulted in greater self-censorship in online discussions (Sinpeng, 2013, p. 429). 
The domination in social networking sites of Duterte’s keyboard army and other supporters, 
whose activities were directed at manipulating social media algorithms and shaping public 
opinion in favor of the current Philippine administration, has discredited and silenced dissent 
(Ong & Cabañes, 2018, p. 3). Like the Cyber Scouts or GCOs, the actions of Duterte’s keyboard 
army may promote self-regulation, especially to those who wish to spare themselves the trouble 
of engaging or being harassed by the Duterte supporters. In these cases, one would see a 
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combination of what Foucault (1982/2001) described as “individualization techniques” and 
“totalization procedures” (p. 332). 
The stories of cyber repression and “patriotic” trolling in Thailand and the Philippines 
show that cyber control, as a technology of government, conducts people’s conduct. Following 
Foucault’s concept of “government of men by men,” the idea that it is the responsibility of 
every Thai citizen to respect the monarchy and uphold the agenda of the state transfers the 
responsibility of policing individuals to individuals. It becomes the responsibility of every 




In examining the practice of censorship and control in contemporary cyberspace, the 
study compared existing literature on Thailand and the Philippines, as both have been 
particularly active in exercising newer forms of surveillance and political repression on the 
internet. Since power in this context operates in digital environments, the exercise of policing 
requires new techniques of administering and maneuvering. New governmental technologies 
such as algorithmic gatekeeping, algorithmic policing, and cyber policing are utilized by 
different agents to instigate fear, engineer public consensus, and control people’s activities and 
behavior.   
This study reassessed the current scholarship on Thai and Philippine cyber control by 
highlighting the intersection of political actors (state and supporters), state policies, and social 
networks. It argued that the relationship between the three framed the nature and structure of 
policing practices in Thai and Philippine cyberspaces. The study also intervened by 
demonstrating how varying forms of autocracy affect the modes of governing the population. 
In this regard, Foucault’s notions of government and biopolitical power were operationalized 
to flesh out fundamental differences between the regimes of practices in Thailand and the 
Philippines. 
In Thailand, the literature showed that mass surveillance is conducted to maintain the 
order prescribed by the state (Laungaramsri, 2016, p. 209). The violation of people’s privacy 
rights was done in the name of “protecting” the national security, and the enactment of pro-
junta and pro-monarchy cyber-related laws and the normalization of spying and cyberbullying 
on the internet were legitimized by a peculiar sense of morality. Citizens were encouraged to 
patrol cyberspace and take part in the activities of organizations that have aligned their 
objectives and ideals with the state. In the Philippines, despite the lack of strict cybercrime 
laws, repression is similarly promoted through algorithmic gatekeeping and cyber trolling. The 
so-called network of disinformation architected by the camp of Duterte (or by his followers) 
has been very active in maneuvering internet traffic and silencing dissent as it takes advantage 
of the current incapability of the Philippines to identify online trolls who use fictitious names. 
Journal of ASEAN Studies   141 
State supporters’ apprehension of others and their projection of virtuous self-image are done in 
the name of “patriotism,” morality, and progress. Note, however, that despite comparing the 
situation in Thai and Philippine cyberspaces, the study does not claim that the above-mentioned 
autocratic practices are exclusive to both countries. In fact, they can be perceived as symptoms 
of the general decline in internet freedom among the member states of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
As Foucault reminds, government does not only pertain to the political structures or 
management of states. Instead, it defines or directs the way individuals or groups conduct and 
behave themselves (Foucault, 1982 in Felluga, 2015, p. 121). Surely, with an ever-increasing 
number of citizens who become active participants on social networking sites, it would make 
sense for governments to adopt new techniques and rethink how it would govern its people. 
While new technologies affect and transform daily life, new regulatory and ideational 
mechanisms persistently control social behaviors. And with the evolution of technology, the 
techniques of policing become more comprehensive and penetrating. 
The regulatory and ideational mechanisms of such technologies allow for the 
manipulation of public consensus in digital communities. Capitalizing on the existing social 
divide in Thailand and the Philippines, both governments have effectively used the us-versus-
them perspective and mobilized people’s sentiments to promote their brand of totalitarianism. 
Admittedly though, observing glimpses of resistance and identifying the apparent systemic 
features of governmental and political interventions in cyberspace may not necessarily solve 
the host of issues that surround it. Nevertheless, unraveling the fundamental nature of 
government and policing in the context of today’s internet is a start. 
 
Notes 
1DDS derives its name from the Davao Death Squad, the infamous vigilante group in Duterte’s 
hometown known for committing extrajudicial killings.  
2In 2019, Facebook removed 12 social media accounts and 10 pages linked to the New Eastern 
Outlook and The New Atlas. These accounts and pages were removed for using fake accounts, 
creating fictitious personas, and driving users to “off-platform blogs posing as news outlets” 
(“Facebook shows posts,” 2019). 
3It is common for the producers of such media texts to claim that they voluntarily publish 
content that supports the government. An interview conducted by Ong and Cabañes (2018) 
explains the rationale behind the perceived credibility and morality in volunteerism. As an 
anonymous Filipino social media influencer informed, it is a must for them to avoid any sign 
of control in engaging in debates or promoting campaigns in social networking sites. Showing 
signs of control would potentially result in losing followers, as they become branded as 
“bayaran” or “paid stooge” (p. 36). 
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